The suspected Polymarket attacker converted approximately 2650000 USD of the funds into POL and then transferred them out
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The suspected attacker converted approximately 2650000 USD of the funds into POL, then transferred out approximately 28640000 units in three transactions POL。
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Data:Polymarket The suspected attacker converted approximately 2650000 USD of the funds into POL
PANews October 30 According to reports by The Block and Decrypt, Arkham data shows that the suspected Polymarket attacker address (0x3F99…Ffc18) converted the proceeds into USDC.e、USDC and POL, holding approximately 2650000 USD POL. Polygonscan shows that the address subsequently transferred out approximately 28640000 units POL. Cybersecurity firm Hudson Rock said that the address was hardcoded into a script hosted by web performance monitoring service DebugBear that contained wallet-stealing code, serving as a backup receiving address. Previously,Polymarket said that a third-party service provider had been compromised and that affected users would receive full compensation. According to Decrypt, this was Polymarket the third security incident this year; previously,May、June had...
Arkham data shows that the suspected Polymarket attacker address 0x3F99…Ffc18 converted USDC.e、USDC into POL。
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The address once held approximately 2650000 USD POL, then transferred out approximately 28640000 units in three transactions POL。
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Hudson Rock said that the address was hardcoded into a script hosted by DebugBear that contained wallet-stealing code.
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Polymarket Previously said that a third-party service provider had been compromised and that affected users would receive full compensation.
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Decrypt reported that this was Polymarket the third security incident this year.
AI-assisted interpretation
The following is analysis, separate from reported facts. Verify important claims independently.
The report describes an on-chain conversion and transfer of funds allegedly related to a Polymarket security incident, but the identities of the address controllers and the attribution of the code remain speculative.
Why it matters to readers
POL Large transfers out may raise concerns about potential selling pressure and security risks, but the transfers themselves do not mean that a sale has already occurred.
This means that the relevant funds are moving on-chain; ordinary users should distinguish between confirmed transaction records and the attacker’s identity, which has not yet been fully verified.
Risks and unknowns
The attacker’s identity has not been fully confirmed.
The code’s attribution, the full scale of the losses, and the amount affected have not been fully confirmed.
Approximately 28640000 units POL It remains unclear whether they have entered the trading market.
The third security incident mentioned in the report did not provide complete details of the earlier incidents.
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Related concepts
USDC.e
This term is not in the glossary yet. Browse related concepts in the glossary.
